Naz
08.05.2006, 18:50
It should be well noted that the jury is still out on the outcome of this specific instance of direct military intervention in Turkish politics. There is no question but that the military was motivated to take strong action by many of the same social, economic, and political conditions that have gnawed away at the Kemalist foundations since the late 1950s. What is perhaps somewhat different this time, however, is the significant influence of the rightists, the ultraconservatives, particularly the Grey Wolves, the terrorist arm of the Nationalist Action Party (formerly the Republican Peasants’ National Party), led by retired Colonel Alparslan Türkes. No longer was the Turkish government able to focus on the leftists. Violence had become endemic, with terrorist groups of every political persuasion engaged in total violence throughout the country. The estimates vary, but something between several thousand and 15,000 people were killed in the last year before the September coup.
On the morning of 12 September 1980, General Kenan Evren, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, led a coup d’état against the government of Suleyman Demirel. On 20 September General Evren announced that retired Admiral Bülent Ulusu, Turkish Ambassador to Italy, would serve as interim Prime Minister.68 It appears from the media accounts of these events that the military leaders want to return power to a tough civilian government that would bring the economic chaos and endemic violence of the terrorists to an end. To achieve this goal, in the first four months since the coup, 32,537 terrorists were detained, and authorities confiscated more than 168,000 firearms, including 757 automatic weapons, over 900,000 rounds of ammunition, 951 sticks of dynamite, 2100 kilos of gunpowder, and 632 explosive devices.69 At the same time, the Turkish Ambassador to the United Nations, Coskun Kirca, called for a constitutional amendment that would scrap the present system of proportionate representation in the Grand National Assembly, substituting instead a "winner take all seats" system. Furthermore, only two parties would be allowed, and the president would be granted special powers in times of national peril.70
In any event, it is clear that new, more radical solutions are needed if the Turkish political system is to survive. The military simply cannot rule for only a brief period as it has in the past, turning over control to the civilians only to have the system deteriorate into chaos again. One is reminded of the ancient saying that "three times is a charm." This is the third time that the military has intervened in Turkish politics since 1960, and while they "might be viewed as a cohesive, progressive political force upholding the tenets of Kemalism,"71 there is a traditional superstition in Turkey about the evil eye. If the Turkish military is, in its role as the deus ex machina of Turkish politics, the veritable talisman against the evil eye of political chaos, then long-term, enduring measures must be instituted.
In a real sense, the Turkish military is uniquely well qualified for the task at hand, both as planners and executors. The Kemalist model, after all, is a rather sound paradigm for reform and stability. A precedent for martial administration has been established. It appears that a tough but scrupulously evenhanded administration by a benevolent yet totalitarian regime will be required. Some of its features could include total censorship of the media, at least partial suspension of civil and political rights, and detention without warrants for a minimum period of ninety days. Such measures are indeed repugnant to a Western liberal democrat, but the situation in Turkey is so grave that it appears that only dictatorial methods will ameliorate it. It will be a difficult time for the people of Turkey. There will be innocents who suffer, but if the country is to survive, then there seems to be no other course of action. To use a popular aphorism, the ball is now in their (the military’s) court. It is up to them to set the goals, determine the strategy, and guide the new course for Turkey. . . and then use whatever force is necessary to achieve it.
By now it should be clear that not only was the Turkish military active in politics during the Ottoman era, but since Atatürk founded the Republic of Turkey, there has been this continuum of military activism or influence which has guided Turkish politics for the past sixty years. While I have used the analogy of the classical dramatic device of the deus ex machina, another more familiar analogy might be that of the 11th Cavalry coming to the rescue. Yet it is my contention that there is a finite limit to the efficacy of these last-minute measures on two counts. First, the Turkish military is justifiably (and understandably) tired of acting in this role; equally justifiably, the military will be less willing to hand over the reins of government to a new civilian regime, its placating statements notwithstanding. Second, the system itself has been so beset with interminable chaos under a series of ineffective, deadlocked coalition governments that the military may not be able to cause the pendulum to swing back. In other words, without a total and open-ended commitment to enduring reforms, regardless of the severity of the measures to be invoked, there is a good chance that military intervention will do little more than exacerbate the internal strife.
There is one vital area that has not been covered here because it is somewhat tangential and is generally ignored by most authors as a factor in this analysis of military intervention in politics. Throughout the modern period, 1960-80, Turkey has been engaged in a serious conflict with Greece over the future of Cyprus.72 This bitter dispute erupted into open warfare during July 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus. This was triggered because the Greek junta’s coup against Makarios had established de facto enosis (union) of the island with Greece. There are direct linkages between the Turkish military’s desire to achieve a final solution to the Cyprus issue and the civilian politicians’ inability or unwillingness to reach a political or diplomatic solution. Hence any final and complete analysis of the role of the Turkish military as a politicized element must take the Cyprus problem into account, for it is the sine qua non of Turkish politics.
At the outset of this article two basic questions were asked. First, how has the Turkish military come to be such an integral and influential actor or interest group in Turkish political affairs during the past two decades? Second, to what degree has the Turkish military molded, guided, and accelerated the process of modernization and the direction of politics in Turkey, since the founding of the republic but particularly during the multiparty era since 1950? By this point it should be quite clear that the answers to these two questions are virtually inseparable and are grounded in the historical and political events that took place in Turkey during this period. The military since Ottoman times has served alternately as an agent of stability and as an agent of change. Yet it has been a constant factor in Turkish politics and could always be counted on to save the republic from internal politicide. In a large measure, without the political intervention by the military, one could expect the Turkish political system to degenerate into total anarchy. At best it might resemble the contemporary state of affairs in Italy; at worst it could lead to a revolution instigated by a coalition of ultraconservatives and Islamic fundamentalists, perhaps somewhat similar to the Iranian experience of the Ayatollah Khomeini.
Hence, in my view, the military must continue to play an active role in Turkish politics. However, it must transcend its traditional role of simple guardians of the republic. Instead, it must commit itself to a new and stable Turkey and to the long-term stern measures that will be necessary to achieve this goal. The price will be high, but there are no easy options if Turkey is to survive.
refrence: Air University Review
On the morning of 12 September 1980, General Kenan Evren, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, led a coup d’état against the government of Suleyman Demirel. On 20 September General Evren announced that retired Admiral Bülent Ulusu, Turkish Ambassador to Italy, would serve as interim Prime Minister.68 It appears from the media accounts of these events that the military leaders want to return power to a tough civilian government that would bring the economic chaos and endemic violence of the terrorists to an end. To achieve this goal, in the first four months since the coup, 32,537 terrorists were detained, and authorities confiscated more than 168,000 firearms, including 757 automatic weapons, over 900,000 rounds of ammunition, 951 sticks of dynamite, 2100 kilos of gunpowder, and 632 explosive devices.69 At the same time, the Turkish Ambassador to the United Nations, Coskun Kirca, called for a constitutional amendment that would scrap the present system of proportionate representation in the Grand National Assembly, substituting instead a "winner take all seats" system. Furthermore, only two parties would be allowed, and the president would be granted special powers in times of national peril.70
In any event, it is clear that new, more radical solutions are needed if the Turkish political system is to survive. The military simply cannot rule for only a brief period as it has in the past, turning over control to the civilians only to have the system deteriorate into chaos again. One is reminded of the ancient saying that "three times is a charm." This is the third time that the military has intervened in Turkish politics since 1960, and while they "might be viewed as a cohesive, progressive political force upholding the tenets of Kemalism,"71 there is a traditional superstition in Turkey about the evil eye. If the Turkish military is, in its role as the deus ex machina of Turkish politics, the veritable talisman against the evil eye of political chaos, then long-term, enduring measures must be instituted.
In a real sense, the Turkish military is uniquely well qualified for the task at hand, both as planners and executors. The Kemalist model, after all, is a rather sound paradigm for reform and stability. A precedent for martial administration has been established. It appears that a tough but scrupulously evenhanded administration by a benevolent yet totalitarian regime will be required. Some of its features could include total censorship of the media, at least partial suspension of civil and political rights, and detention without warrants for a minimum period of ninety days. Such measures are indeed repugnant to a Western liberal democrat, but the situation in Turkey is so grave that it appears that only dictatorial methods will ameliorate it. It will be a difficult time for the people of Turkey. There will be innocents who suffer, but if the country is to survive, then there seems to be no other course of action. To use a popular aphorism, the ball is now in their (the military’s) court. It is up to them to set the goals, determine the strategy, and guide the new course for Turkey. . . and then use whatever force is necessary to achieve it.
By now it should be clear that not only was the Turkish military active in politics during the Ottoman era, but since Atatürk founded the Republic of Turkey, there has been this continuum of military activism or influence which has guided Turkish politics for the past sixty years. While I have used the analogy of the classical dramatic device of the deus ex machina, another more familiar analogy might be that of the 11th Cavalry coming to the rescue. Yet it is my contention that there is a finite limit to the efficacy of these last-minute measures on two counts. First, the Turkish military is justifiably (and understandably) tired of acting in this role; equally justifiably, the military will be less willing to hand over the reins of government to a new civilian regime, its placating statements notwithstanding. Second, the system itself has been so beset with interminable chaos under a series of ineffective, deadlocked coalition governments that the military may not be able to cause the pendulum to swing back. In other words, without a total and open-ended commitment to enduring reforms, regardless of the severity of the measures to be invoked, there is a good chance that military intervention will do little more than exacerbate the internal strife.
There is one vital area that has not been covered here because it is somewhat tangential and is generally ignored by most authors as a factor in this analysis of military intervention in politics. Throughout the modern period, 1960-80, Turkey has been engaged in a serious conflict with Greece over the future of Cyprus.72 This bitter dispute erupted into open warfare during July 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus. This was triggered because the Greek junta’s coup against Makarios had established de facto enosis (union) of the island with Greece. There are direct linkages between the Turkish military’s desire to achieve a final solution to the Cyprus issue and the civilian politicians’ inability or unwillingness to reach a political or diplomatic solution. Hence any final and complete analysis of the role of the Turkish military as a politicized element must take the Cyprus problem into account, for it is the sine qua non of Turkish politics.
At the outset of this article two basic questions were asked. First, how has the Turkish military come to be such an integral and influential actor or interest group in Turkish political affairs during the past two decades? Second, to what degree has the Turkish military molded, guided, and accelerated the process of modernization and the direction of politics in Turkey, since the founding of the republic but particularly during the multiparty era since 1950? By this point it should be quite clear that the answers to these two questions are virtually inseparable and are grounded in the historical and political events that took place in Turkey during this period. The military since Ottoman times has served alternately as an agent of stability and as an agent of change. Yet it has been a constant factor in Turkish politics and could always be counted on to save the republic from internal politicide. In a large measure, without the political intervention by the military, one could expect the Turkish political system to degenerate into total anarchy. At best it might resemble the contemporary state of affairs in Italy; at worst it could lead to a revolution instigated by a coalition of ultraconservatives and Islamic fundamentalists, perhaps somewhat similar to the Iranian experience of the Ayatollah Khomeini.
Hence, in my view, the military must continue to play an active role in Turkish politics. However, it must transcend its traditional role of simple guardians of the republic. Instead, it must commit itself to a new and stable Turkey and to the long-term stern measures that will be necessary to achieve this goal. The price will be high, but there are no easy options if Turkey is to survive.
refrence: Air University Review